Introduction

 

Decolonization, the growth of the European Union, and the rebuilding of post-WWII Europe have all resulted in major social and political changes for Europe as a continent and as an idea.  One key factor in these changes has been the extent to which postwar non-European[1] immigration has both influenced political policies and ideologies within a hitherto relatively racially homogenous Europe, and altered what it means to be European (Zolberg 1992, 331). Given both the size in terms of economic power and population, of the UK, France, and Germany, the way in which they have chosen to address non-European immigration and the social and political changes that have resulted from it can function as a guide to the long-term implications for Europe as a whole and all its citizens (InfoBase Factsheet 2006), (InfoBase Factsheet 2006).

 

Despite the economic and social necessity of increased non-European immigration in the post-war period and the differing policy approaches and structures of the UK, France, and Germany, there has been a common social and political negative backlash against immigration, increased ethnic discrimination, and growing structural economic inequality against non-European immigrants and their descendants that is forcing these EU member states to reassess their respective national identities and openness to future immigration.  Recent changes in domestic politics and immigration policy in all three countries suggest that, notwithstanding the differing political structures of these three countries, concepts of citizenship and national identity, and initial political and economic reasoning for non-European immigration, they share a correlation between the increase of non-European immigrants as a percentage of the total population and an increase in a sense of group threat among their White Europeans citizens to their new non-white countrymen.  This group threat has manifested itself in three ways: 1) rising right-wing nationalist political parties and policies, 2) stricter laws discouraging further immigration, and 3) conflicts between White Europeans and Europe’s new non-White residents (Quillian 1995, 586), (Southern Poverty Law Center 2001).

 

Postwar European Immigration 1945-1975

 

The devastation of World War II across Europe, both in terms of lives lost and physical infrastructure, and the resultant need to quickly rebuild her economies, facilitated an immediate necessity for an influx of cheap labor (O'Brien 2002).  The allied bombing of Germany in the final stages of World War II left its people poor and its economy ruined (Mayer 1969, 7).  In the UK, France, and Germany whole cities were in ruin which needed to be quickly rebuilt, using the millions of dollars received through the Marshall Plan (Ellwood 1992).  In France, it was within the High Council for Population and the Family, attached to General De Gaulle’s provisional government, that the principles of the new immigration policy (NIP) were defined. “Its basic points included:  (1) repopulating France in order to compensate for its demographic decline by taking into account shortages of labour in various industrial sectors; (2) selecting the foreign elements likely to be introduced into the territory and (3) setting up a programme of implantation and assimilation for them” (Viet 1999).

 

For the United Kingdom and France, domestic and international political pressure along with armed independence movements led to massive decolonization among their former subjects in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.  Simultaneously, England and France, both countries having a tradition of ‘jus soli’ citizenship meaning all residents of their colonies were citizens, could depend on the free movement of these colonial peoples to the mainland as they sought a chance at individual economic improvement. Consequently, in the postwar period, both the UK and France enacted immigration policies to encourage migration from their colonies. Germany, in contrast, had a history of ‘jus sanguis’ and no colonial holdings at the end of World War II; she instead encouraged immigration from Turkey through postwar policies (German Embassy 2001-2006). The desire by all three countries, regardless of passed differing citizenship traditions, to rebuild their economies, led to policies between 1945 and the early to mid-1970’s to encourage migration of these populations to fill their domestic need for labor.

 

Different Policy Approaches/ Same Goal

 

France’s policy response to this economic need, building on its history of ‘jus soli’ citizenship laws and stated beliefs in republicanism and assimilation, was to pass a law in 1947 that recognized the equal rights of colonial French as French citizens and provide free movement of those citizens throughout colonial France (Julien 1950). This, along with the Algerian and Vietnamese civil wars and eventual independence in the early 1960’s, enabled millions of its colonial subjects in Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia to come to France and contribute to the rebirth of its economy. These policy adjustments, while beneficially considering the great need for labor, were enacted without consideration of the social and political implications to both the mainly Algerian immigrants in France and France itself.  “Labour-force policy initially overshadowed population policy, with new entries dictated much more by the analysis of the economic situation than concerns with repopulation (Viet 1999). 

 

However, early harbingers of later racial tension and official hypocrisy between stated egalitarianism and an unequal reality could be seen in actions like the newly established Office of National d’Immigration (ONI) in 1945, which, fearing the “…disintegration of the French ‘ethnic group’ or ‘race’…”, set about attempting to stem the tide of North African and Asians immigrants by encouraging more ‘culturally compatible’ ones from Italy, albeit with little success (Viet 1999). The economic advantage and policy changes led to thousands of immigrants coming to France, mainly from Algeria and surrounding northern Francophone Africa.  “[B]y 1956 there were 300,000 Algerians in France… and by 1965 there were over 500,000 Algerian nationals in France” (House 2006).

 

The United Kingdom similarly had both vast and costly colonial holdings after the war and a policy of ‘jus soli’ citizenship that they sought to manipulate to help facilitate economic rebirth.  However, unlike France’s initial resistance of decolonization in Indochina and Algeria, the UK moved almost immediately after the war to decolonize present-day India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Palestine with the result that by the late 1970’s most of the UK’s colonial possessions were independent nations (Ostara Publications 1999).  The United Kingdom, as a policy to encourage the movement of immigrants as labor in the face of decolonization, passed the British Nationality Act of 1948. The act made citizens of the British Commonwealth an official designation as ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies,’ which entitled them to, “…complete freedom of movement and, in addition, the right to be registered as a citizen…after a single year of ordinary residence…” (Thornberry 1965, 198).  Although this laissez-faire policy was meant to encourage immigration from all British Commonwealth countries, most immigrants were not from Canada or Australia, but were Commonwealth citizens of color, a reflection of the wave of independence up until the late 1970’s in the former British Caribbean, African, and Indian subcontinent, their dire political and economic climate domestically, and the need for labor on the British Isle (Hansen 2000, 216).

 

Germany, arguably the most financially and physically damaged of the three countries, looked to encourage immigration of cheap labor not from any former colonies but rather to its poorer neighbors like Turkey. Additionally, since Germany maintained a citizenship policy of ‘jus sanguis’ these mostly male immigrants were not lured with the promise of citizenship, but rather were, through the ‘Gasterbeiter’ or guest worker program, encouraged to come for a year or two to work and then return home. As the economies of the participating European countries grew in the 1950’s and 1960’s however, the percentage of Turkish guest workers staying in Germany grew, creating domestic ties and engendering domestic hostility (Oezcan 2004).

Economic Downturn, Policy Shifts, & Rise of the Rightwing Parties 1965-1985

 

By the 1970’s the domestic birthrate in the UK, Germany, and France had begun to fall precipitously, at the same time that the non-European immigration numbers were steadily rising, resulting in a substantial increase in their percentage of the total population.  Just as the differing policies of the UK, France, and Germany had both the uniform intended goal of increasing immigrant labor, and unintended goal of increasing non-European residents, the uniformity of the economic downturn that swept Europe in the 1970’s, the decline of European birthrates, and the rise in non-European immigrants produced similar intended policies of stricter immigration rules and the unintended rise of right-wing anti-immigrant political parties.  

 

In the early 1970’s not only showed a decline in domestic birth rates among Europeans but also ended the great postwar period of economic growth with a continental economic downturn facilitated by the OPEC initiated oil shocks in 1973 and 1978 and the resultant spike in prices (Rand Corporation 2005).  In the UK, “…[i]nvestment remained low in the 1970’s, the inflation rate soared, and at the same time, there was a substantial increase in unemployment” (Laquer 1992, 424). In France, “…growth halved, inflation doubled, and unemployment quadrupled” (Laquer 1992, 423). And in Germany, …[the economy] showed weakness; the current-account deficit grew, …and competitiveness had suddenly plummeted, perhaps mainly as a result of rising labor costs” (Laquer 1992, 423).  Despite their cultural and policy differences vis-à-vis immigrants in general and racial minorities specifically, the cumulative uniform effect of these economic and demographic changes in the UK, France, and Germany was a  sense of perceived group-threat of those White Europeans that benefitted from the social status quo resulting in more discriminatory restrictions on immigration. “ The greater the sense of threat to their prerogatives, the more likely are members of the dominant group to express prejudice against the threatening outsiders” (Quillian 1995, 588).

 

While the quantitative result was a steady rise in the percentage of the population that was non-European, the policy implication in all three countries was the tightening of immigration laws to stem the growing public anti-immigrant sentiment. “The boom years ended with the rising oil prices in the 1970’s and the consequent unemployment.  Labour recruitment abruptly stopped, and governments developed schemes to encourage the ‘guest workers’ to leave” (Pettigrew 1998, 80). 

 

In the United Kingdom, despite its professed multicultural approach, the policy was changed in 1972 to make only those with work permits or people with parents or grandparents born in the UK eligible to immigrate.  This policy was meant to most specifically apply to the large Indian minority from Uganda that had immigrated between 1968 and 1972 (Bloch 2002).  Germany, unique in its blend of federal multiculturalism, altered its policies in 1973 in the wake of the 1970’s economic downturn and sought to decrease non-European immigration by banning the continued recruitment of foreign workers. “Germany stopped further recruitment because it was becoming clear that migrant workers were settling and were being joined by their spouses and children” (Miller and Plewa 2003, 6).  Finally, French policymakers, with their emphasis on republican assimilationism, responded in 1974 with the official halt on inward immigration and actively encouraged immigrants to return home (Paris 2005).

 

Birth of Anti-Immigrant Political Parties

 

During the same period when immigration in the UK, France, and Germany took on an increasingly non-European dimension, these countries experienced the birth and rise of anti-immigration nationalist right-wing political parties whose expressed platforms were more racist than purely anti-foreigner.  Again, it must be stated that these nations political systems, while distinct in terms of unitarianism versus federalism, assimilationism versus multiculturalism, and the size, power, and structure of its legislative and executive branches, experienced concurrent domestic political movements whose focus was distinctly and uniformly anti-immigrant and anti-ethnic minority.

 

While the extreme right-wing party in Britain, called the National Front, did not make sizeable electoral gains, their racist, anti-immigration platform did filter into the rhetoric of the dominant Labour and Tory parties during this period  (Kitschelt 1995, 244-245). The National Front platform stated:

“[W]e call for an immediate halt to all further immigration, the immediate deportation of all bogus asylum seekers, all criminal entrants, and illegal immigrants, and the introduction of a system of voluntary resettlement whereby those immigrants and their descendants” (British National Party Manifesto 2005).

 

Labour and Tory leaders voiced a growing racist sentiment in British public opinion that coincided with the economic recession, slowing birth rate, and increased racial diversity.  The infamous speech by the Conservative shadow minister Enoch Powell in 1968 that there would be, “… ‘rivers of blood’ if immigration and the multiculturalization of British society continued”, and a poll showing that 75% of the British population agreed with him, showed both breath of public sentiment and the degree to which the main political parties had taken a far-right platform (Kitschelt 1995, 247).

 

            While Germany has had a much-documented history of far right-wing political parties, this period saw the growth of parties whose platforms were specifically against further immigration and ethnic minorities and played upon the economic insecurities of the unemployed Whites to blame their plight on the growing populations of non-European residents.  The National Democratic Party of Germany, created in 1964 from a combination of several rightist parties, while again not making electoral gains, occurred simultaneously with a 500% rise its youth membership from 1964 to 1978 (Kitschelt 1995, 206-210).  France, with its espoused refusal to welcome ethnic minorities, saw the birth of the racist anti-immigration National Front in 1972, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen which platform included, “…the ‘exclusion’ of native French people from housing and benefits” (Fenby 1999, 209-234).  Its electoral victories weren’t realized until the late 1980’s and 1990’s, but its creation in the 1970s reflects a shift in popular sentiment as a result of the economic downturn. “56% of French said there were too many Arabs in France” (Southern Poverty Law Center 2001).

 

Europe, Diversity, and Immigration at the Turn of the Century 1975-2005

 

Like the previous period of immigrant encouragement directly after the war and the tightening of immigration restrictions in the wake of economic hard times, this most recent period in France, Germany, and the UK belies their cultural and political differences and produces uniform electoral and social backlash to the racial and ethnic diversity caused by immigration.  While the public became increasingly aware and unhappy with the degree to which their countries were changing demographically, policymakers set about to restrict further changes through more conservative-leaning immigration reforms. 

 

In 1993, the French government approved the 2nd Pasqua laws, further restricting immigration and making it more difficult for people with foreign-born parents to claim citizenship. Similarly, children born in France to foreign parents were required to make a “voluntary declaration” of their intention to acquire citizenship as a means to lower the number of ‘sans papiers’ or people without legal documents in France (Fenby 1999, 209-234).  In Germany, following an 800% increase in the number of attacks on foreigners (Human Rights Watch 1995), the legislature passed a reform of the Basic Law that sought to discourage so-called frivolous applications for asylum by returning asylum seekers who entered first through other countries.  The popularity of these anti-immigrant efforts and concern with falling European birth rates can also be seen in the adoption of the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU) in 1998 of a platform of “Kinder Statt Inder” – have children, don’t let in Indians.  Even in the United Kingdom, with its history of multiculturalism and urban diversity, was not immune to the swing among its White citizens toward anti-immigration fervor that hid a more racist underpinning.  “Great Britain is the most hostile country in Europe towards asylum-seekers, according to the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia” (Southern Poverty Law Center 2001).  Growing public support led the ultra-right wing British National Party to increase its electoral support from 57,000 votes in 1997 to over 100,000 in 1999, and to win in 2002 three local city council seats (BBC News. 2003).

 

Conclusion

 

The three large and economic powerhouses of Europe of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have vastly dissimilar histories, institutions, and cultures.  However, what they do share is a long history of racial and ethnic homogeneity within their borders that has come to an end in the postwar period.  This new diversity due to political, social, and economic factors, both at home and abroad, has cause these very different nations to respond both politically and socially in remarkably similar ways.  All three actively encouraged immigration when cheap labor was needed to rebuild their devastated economies. Similarly, each tightened immigration laws and witnessed the birth of racist anti-immigrant political movements in response to falling birth rates and rising percentages of non-European residents.  This similarity continues today in that their right wing and center-right political parties have used immigration to build large followings and further restrict the numbers of non-Europeans citizens.  The irony is that these cultural and institutional differences, in reaction to the problem of immigrant integration, have led to the same outcomes of racial tension, immigrant exclusion and radicalization, and political conservatism.

           

Germany’s combination of denial of German citizenship because of its ‘jus sanguis’ policy and multicultural federalism has produced enclaves of ethnic neighborhoods where immigrants and their descendants feel like permanent visitors, which has led to Jihadist cells in its large cities.  France’s egalitarian and assimilationist policies have produced laws like the 1978 statute that makes it an offense to “compile or study personal information which directly or indirectly reveals racial or ethnic origins.” (American Renaissance 2006).  This prevents the government from accurately and honestly documenting and solving the problem of immigrant integration as well as understanding the violent crime that is associated with such isolated communities.  The United Kingdom also has failed to solve its problem of isolated immigrant communities and has, like the other two nations, responded to the racial and ethnic tensions that increased diversity has created with policies and political platforms that claim to be either against illegal immigration or concerned about safety in the “War on Terrorism.”  As in France and Germany, this has resulted in segregated ethnic minorities with vast educational and economic inequities and no hope of acceptance into the idea of the host country’s heritage and identity. This has potentially dire consequences. 

 

“You play by the rules, you get an education, and you end up filling shelves in a supermarket.  Until Europe opens up its’ concept of itself to include this population and grows beyond some white supremacist past, Europe will increasingly be a breeding ground for terrorism and danger.” (Boodram 2006) Given the low birthrates of White Europeans and the need for cheap labor, if Europe does not embrace the ‘browning’ of Europe it will continue to feel invaded and implement domestic policies that disenfranchise people of color, to the long-term detriment to both immigrants of color and native-born White citizen.

​

Michael Jackson is a political analyst/researcher and freelance writer/editor living in New York City. He holds a B.A. in political science with a concentration in American Politics & Urban Studies from California State University, East Bay and was formerly graduate fellow at the Columbia University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences' Ph.D program

 

 

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[1] Given that most of Turkey’s population and geographic area sits in Asia and that their religion and history set them apart from that of most of Europe, they will be considered non-European for this paper.